cross/i686-linux-glibc/buildroot/buildroot-2025.05/package/connman/0002-dnsproxy-Address-CVE-2...

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From 8d3be0285f1d4667bfe85dba555c663eb3d704b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?=EC=8B=A0=EC=9C=A4=EC=A0=9C=28=ED=95=99=EB=B6=80=EC=83=9D-?=
=?UTF-8?q?=EC=86=8C=ED=94=84=ED=8A=B8=EC=9B=A8=EC=96=B4=EC=A0=84=EA=B3=B5?=
=?UTF-8?q?=29?= <ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr>
Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 10:48:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] dnsproxy: Address CVE-2025-32366 vulnerability
In Connman parse_rr in dnsproxy.c has a memcpy length
that depends on an RR RDLENGTH value (i.e., *rdlen=ntohs(rr->rdlen)
and memcpy(response+offset,*end,*rdlen)). Here, rdlen may be larger
than the amount of remaining packet data in the current state of
parsing. As a result, values of stack memory locations may be sent
over the network in a response.
This patch adds a check to ensure that (*end + *rdlen) does not exceed
the valid range. If the condition is violated, the function returns
-EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Dario Binacchi <dario.binacchi@amarulasolutions.com>
Upstream: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=8d3be0285f1d4667bfe85dba555c663eb3d704b4
---
src/dnsproxy.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/dnsproxy.c b/src/dnsproxy.c
index 7ee26d9ff886..1dd2f7f5d47e 100644
--- a/src/dnsproxy.c
+++ b/src/dnsproxy.c
@@ -998,6 +998,9 @@ static int parse_rr(const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *start,
if ((offset + *rdlen) > *response_size)
return -ENOBUFS;
+ if ((*end + *rdlen) > max)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
memcpy(response + offset, *end, *rdlen);
*end += *rdlen;
--
2.43.0